WORLD, Page 46 More Reason for Hope Than FearThough the U.S. loses a diplomatic edge as the Soviets andChinese grow closer, Washington still has much to gain fromthe new detenteBy Cyrus Vance and Richard C. Holbrooke
If all goes well, the year's most spectacular photo opportunity
will present itself in May, when Mikhail Gorbachev and Deng
Xiaoping meet in Beijing. But this will be much more than a
photo-op. Such a summit would formally end an important advantage
enjoyed by the U.S. since Richard Nixon visited China in 1972:
Washington could talk to the leadership in both Beijing and Moscow,
but there was no high-level dialogue between the Soviets and the
Chinese and virtually no significant contact at lower levels.
Being able to speak to two sides while they cannot seriously
talk to each other is a tremendous plus in diplomacy. At times some
Washington officials sought to overplay "the China card," but the
Chinese had a keen sense of how far to let things go. In 1978
President Jimmy Carter established full diplomatic relations
between Washington and Beijing, putting the relationship on a
permanent, rather than personal, basis.
The Nixon-Carter policies, ultimately endorsed by President
Reagan, had at least three major consequences. First, the Chinese
were drawn into constructive interaction with the other nations
along the Pacific Rim, thus ending a long period in which the
Chinese were regarded as dangerously destabilizing. Second,
America's strategic position, widely assumed to be imperiled by the
disastrous ending of its involvement in the Viet Nam War, was
unexpectedly enhanced. Finally, the new relationship between China,
the United States and Japan dealt a diplomatic setback to the
Soviet Union throughout the region.
Nonetheless, the United States should not fear the ending of
its monopoly of Big Three summit dialogue. Sino-American relations
are now firmly based on mutual interests that go far beyond a
common attitude toward Moscow. Gorbachev and Deng will not emerge
from a summit ideologically reunified or recommitted to joint
support of subversion. In the Third World, Marxism has lost its
attractiveness as an ideology and an economic theory; men calling
themselves Marxists openly discuss what they can learn from
capitalist societies like South Korea. However, even as the
socialist economies liberalize, the fundamental disagreements still
exist between our democratic principles and the Communist system.
Gorbachev and Deng have the ability to reduce tensions
significantly in Asia. Two legacies of the past should be at the
top of their agenda. In both cases the U.S. can play an important
role.
The Korean peninsula. For 20 years, Moscow and Beijing have
vied for the position of First Friend to North Korea -- each trying
to outdo the other in supporting its tyrannical leader, Kim Il
Sung, 76. The result has been that North Korea has been under
little or no pressure to moderate its attitude toward South Korea.
Given Kim Il Sung's desire to unify Korea under his own brutal
leadership, progress may be impossible until he passes from the
scene. But even Kim, a pure Stalinist, has shown a willingness to
open more lines of communication with Seoul, and South Korean
President Roh Tae Woo himself predicts a North-South summit soon.
The less the Soviet Union and China are forced, by their
rivalry, to support Kim's outdated myths, the more rapidly both
countries can develop valuable economic and political ties with
South Korea.
Kampuchea. This is the most critical area in which Deng and
Gorbachev could make a contribution to peace. Since the Vietnamese
invasion of Kampuchea a decade ago drove the Khmer Rouge into
enclaves along the border with Thailand, the country has lived in
a shadow world, no longer terrorized by Pol Pot and his gang of
murderers but still under foreign occupation, with fighting
continuing along the borders.
Moscow and Beijing picked sides a long time ago. The Soviets
backed Hanoi and the pro-Vietnamese faction in Phnom Penh, headed
by Hun Sen, while China supported the Khmer Rouge. Primarily for
cosmetic reasons, even the Chinese finally abandoned Pol Pot
publicly, while continuing to support his army.
Frenetic diplomatic activity is now under way in at least half
a dozen capitals. In the wings, waiting to play yet another
dramatic scene on center stage, is Prince Sihanouk. Despite his
mercurial behavior, Sihanouk continues to personify his
nation-state to his own people and the world. He is essential to
any settlement.
All this is encouraging, but a settlement in Kampuchea requires
the support of both Moscow and Beijing. The original reasons for
the Sino-Soviet rivalry in what was then termed Cambodia have been
overtaken by post-1970 internal changes in the Soviet Union and
China. If Moscow and Beijing agree to use their influence to force
both sides to deal with Sihanouk, then a settlement becomes
possible, given the great dependence of all Kampuchean factions on
outsiders.
But there is a great danger: the Khmer Rouge must not be given
an opportunity to return to power in Kampuchea. Lately much has
been made of the idea that certain "senior leaders" of the Khmer
Rouge, including Pol Pot, must leave. But there is also a distinct
possibility, as Sihanouk himself has indicated, that the Khmer
Rouge might be permitted to retain a separate military
organization. And in addition, Khieu Samphan, the head of the
faction, would be allowed to participate in a coalition government.
The U.S. must oppose these concessions. Khieu Samphan is as
much an international outlaw as Pol Pot. If the Khmer Rouge is
permitted to remain armed, it would constitute an enormous danger
to Kampuchea. Given a chance, once the Vietnamese are gone, the men
of the killing fields would undoubtedly seek full power again by
whatever means available.
The U.S. must play an active role if such a tragedy is to be
averted. It should not encourage or appear to sponsor any
settlement that allows the Khmer Rouge to return to Phnom Penh as
an organization inside a coalition.
American policy under Carter and Reagan restored Washington's
influence in Asia and established a relatively stable balance of
power among the four major players in the Pacific: the U.S., China,
Japan and the Soviet Union. If Gorbachev truly wishes to make the
Soviet Union a participant in the region's "economic miracle," as
he has repeatedly said, he should accept that balance of power as
well as the American naval presence, which is an important
component of that stability.
Much would still remain to be done, notably resolving the
dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union over several small
islands in the Kurile chain, what the Japanese call the Northern
Territories, which have been controlled by the U.S.S.R. since World
War II. The Soviets should also open their far east much more fully
to foreign trade and visitors, and operate their own Pacific fleet
in a way that does not raise concern over Soviet objectives.
With one leader nearing the end of his historic era and the
other encumbered by domestic problems, there is some uncertainty
about the permanence of what Deng and Gorbachev decide. But in
foreign policy, these two men still talk with the greatest
authority. They have it in their power not only to end formally a
long period of hostility but also to make an enormous contribution
to peace. It may be too early to hail a new era in Asia. But the
good news is that an event that would have caused waves of concern
from New Delhi to Washington only a few years ago will unfold this
year in Beijing with much more reason for hope than fear.
